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Abstract
The curse of dimensionality has remained a challenge for a wide
variety of algorithms in data mining, clustering, classification and
privacy. Recently, it was shown that an increasing dimensional-
ity makes the data resistant to effective privacy. The theoretical
results seem to suggest that the dimensionality curse is a funda-
mental barrier to privacy preservation. However, in practice, we
show that some of the common properties of real data can be
leveraged in order to greatly ameliorate the negative effects of the
curse of dimensionality. In real data sets, many dimensions con-
tain high levels of inter-attribute correlations. Such correlations en-
able the use of a process known as vertical fragmentation in order
to decompose the data into vertical subsets of smaller dimension-
ality. An information-theoretic criterion of mutual information is
used in the vertical decomposition process. This allows the use
of an anonymization process, which is based on combining results
from multiple independent fragments. We present a general ap-
proach which can be applied to the k-anonymity, ℓ-diversity, and
t-closeness models. In the presence of inter-attribute correlations,
such an approach continues to be much more robust in higher di-
mensionality, without losing accuracy. We present experimental re-
sults illustrating the effectiveness of the approach. This approach
is resilient enough to prevent identity, attribute, and membership
disclosure attack.
1 Introduction.
The problem of privacy-preservation has been studied exten-
sively in recent years, because of the increasing amount of
personal information which has become available in the con-
text of a wide variety of applications. Starting with the sem-
inal work in [1], a significant amount of work has been done
on the problem of privacy preservation of different kinds of
data. Numerous models [1, 5, 7, 18, 19, 22, 24] have been
proposed for the problem of privacy preservation. However,
it has been shown that data anonymization is increasingly
difficult with dimensionality [2, 3], and the challenges ex-
tend to most privacy models.
The reason for the ineffectiveness of high-dimensional
algorithms is simple. With increasing dimensionality, a
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larger number of attributes are available for background
attacks, even when the perturbation on a single attribute is
significant. As a result, it has been shown theoretically in
[2] that significantly larger perturbations are required with
increasing dimensionality, and this reduces the effectiveness
of the approach for privacy preservation. These results
extend to a variety of models such as k-anonymity and ℓ-
diversity[6].
An important observation about a blind anonymization
process is that it often does not (fully) recognize that depen-
dencies among the attributes may make a particular combi-
nation of dimensions more or less susceptible to anonymiza-
tion. While such dependencies are implicitly utilized by
many anonymization methods, their impact is often diluted
by the overall anonymization procedure. Furthermore, the
same dependencies impact the amount of information, which
may be available in a particular subset of attributes for data
mining applications. For example, an attribute such as Age
and Salary may be highly correlated, and the differential im-
pact of adding the attribute Salary may be less than adding
another attribute such as Sex to the data.
One solution to the curse of dimensionality is to simply
use feature selection [21, 23] in order to reduce the dimen-
sionality of the data set, and retain a small subset of attributes
which retains non-redundant information for a particular ap-
plication. However, it is inevitable, that a pure feature se-
lection approach will lose a significant amount of informa-
tion for many application-specific scenarios. Therefore, a
relevant question is as follows: “Is it still somehow possible
to retain all the attributes in the data, while using the non-
redundancy of some subsets of attributes in the anonymiza-
tion process to prevent identity and attribute disclosure at-
tack, and also retain most of the utility in the data for mining
scenarios?”.
A less drastic approach than feature selection is the
concept of vertical fragmentation. The idea is to break up
the data set into different subsets of attributes using vertical
fragmentation, and anonymize each subset independently.
The results from the different subsets of attributes then
need to be combined for a particular application. Since all
attributes are still retained, the amount of information loss of
fragmentation is less than that of feature selection. The exact
nature of the fragmentation may depend upon the specific
application at hand. For example:
• In a supervised application, the fragments may be com-
pletely disjoint and share no attributes other than the
class attribute. Thus, while the correspondence informa-
tion among different fragments is lost, this may not be
as critical, since the class variable can be independently
learned from each fragment. The amount of informa-
tion lost is limited in such cases, especially if the individ-
ual fragments are carefully chosen based on information-
theoretic principles. The results from the different frag-
ments can then be combined carefully on an aggregate
basis in order to obtain high quality classification re-
sults. Care needs to be taken in the fragmentation pro-
cess that the common class attribute may not be used in
order to partially join the fragments together, and reduce
the anonymity.
• In an unsupervised application, the fragments may need
to have one or more common attributes in order to en-
sure a limited level of correspondence between different
fragments. This case is actually not too different from
the supervised case. The main difference is that instead
of the class attribute, it is the common attribute which
needs to be carefully accounted for during the fragmen-
tation process.
In this paper, we primarily focus on the supervised scenario
of classification as a first application. The generalizations to
other unsupervised scenarios will be handled in future work.
It should be emphasized that while the theoretical re-
sults of the dimensionality curse still hold true [2], their
practical impact can be greatly alleviated by carefully ac-
counting for the nature of the data set in a particular appli-
cation. Pathological cases may exist in which every feature
is independent of one another, and in such cases, the ear-
lier theoretical results on the curse of dimensionality con-
tinue to hold true. However, such pathological cases rarely
arise in practice. Therefore, the goal of fragmentation is
to leverage the mutual information within different features
in order to alleviate the dimensionality curse in the vast
majority of cases. The experimental results of this paper
show that the fragmentation method can achieve signifi-
cant improvements over the currently available methods. It
should also be emphasized that the fragmentation method is
a meta-algorithm which can be combined with any existing
anonymization algorithm in order to improve its effective-
ness. We start with the k-anonymity model in this paper
because we believe such a hard problem like curse of di-
mensionality must be first addressed in the simplest and most
relaxed privacy model. Then, we explain how the fragmenta-
tion process can be generalized to satisfy the ℓ-diversity[22]
(or t-closeness[19]) requirement. In addition, we discuss
how the fragmentation brings in the membership disclosure
protection[32]. In general, the fragmentation process has the
potential to be extended for other privacy models, because
of its meta-approach, which is more easily generalizable.
This might eventually provide unprecedented flexibility in
using the fragmentation method as a general-purpose meta-
algorithm in the context of a wide variety of scenarios.
This paper is organized as follows. The remainder of
this section discusses related work. Section 2 discusses
the overview of the approach for the k-anonymity. Section
3 discusses details of the fragment-based k-anonymization
method. Extending the fragmentation approach for ℓ-
diversity (or t-closeness) is shown in Section 4. In addition,
this section shows how the fragmentation-based anonymiza-
tion can prevent the membership attack. The experimental
results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 contains the
conclusions and summary.
2 Related Work.
The problem of privacy preservation was first studied in
[1]. This approach was based on noise-based perturbation
of the underlying data. Subsequently, the problem of k-
anonymization of data was proposed in [24]. Other models
for data privacy have been proposed in [22, 19]. Numer-
ous methods [15, 16, 11, 17, 27, 28] have been proposed for
effective and efficient k-anonymization, and this continues
to remain one of the most widely used models in the liter-
ature because of its simplicity. The theoretical results illus-
trating the degradation of privacy-preservation methods with
increasing dimensionality have been discussed in [2, 3, 4].
The work in [12] proposed an anonymization method for
high-dimensional data. However, it is only applicable to
sparse transactional data, and is heavily dependent of the
sparse structure of transaction data in order to achieve this
goal. Kifer [33] suggested the idea of releasing anonymized
marginals beside the anonymized original table. However,
the original table must still be anonymized as a whole which
results in high information loss. Furthermore, publishing the
marginals makes the published data highly workload depen-
dant. The privacy models in [29, 30, 31] can cope with the
problem of curse of dimensionality by reducing the num-
ber of quasi-identifiers1. That is, they make an assumption
about the number of quasi-identifiers known by an attacker,
and apply anonymization only on limited number of quasi-
identifiers. However, this assumption may not hold true in
some cases. Other relevant works [26, 20] are able to pro-
vide some protection in the high dimensional case, though
they can be challenged in some circumstances [14]. Further-
more, any of these methods can be used in combination with
our approach, which is designed as a more general purpose
meta-algorithm. Finally, the concept of vertical partitioning
and fragmentation has been explored in the context of dis-
1Although the works in [29, 30] are originally proposed for the set-
valued (transaction) data, the relational data can be transformed to set-
valuded data for anonymization.
tributed data privacy with cryptographic protocols [25], or
for capturing confidential privacy constraints in the context
of such methods [8, 10]. The goals and motivations of these
methods are quite different, and are not at all focused on the
problem of high dimensional anonymization.
In the context of increasing dimensionality, it is natural
to explore feature selection [23, 21] as an alternative in
order to reduce the data dimensionality. However, this is
a rather drastic solution, which can impact the quality of
the underlying results significantly. Therefore, this paper
proposes the approach of fragmentation as a general-purpose
meta-algorithm in order to improve the robustness of high-
dimensional anonymization algorithms.
3 Overview of The Approach for The Fragmentation
K-Anonymity
In this section, we first introduce the most important nota-
tions used in the fragmentation-based k-anonymity in Ta-
ble 1. An overview is then provided about vertical frag-
mentation, and its incorporation as a general-purpose meta-
algorithm for privacy preservation.
Table 1: List of notations in fragmentation k-anonymity
notation explanation
F a vertical fragmentation
Fi i
th fragment in fragmentation F
EQij j
th equivalence class in fragments Fi
Cij set of all class values in equivalence class EQij
P (S) power set of set S
|.| size of a set
3.1 Vertical Fragmentation Let T be a relation defined
over a schema T (Af1 , A
f
2 , ..., A
f
n, A
c) where Afi represents
the feature attributes, and Ac is the class attribute. A vertical
fragmentation of relation T splits the feature variables into
multiple non-overlapping fragments. Formally, a vertical
fragmentation is defined as follows:
DEFINITION 3.1. (VERTICAL FRAGMENTATION). Given
a relation schema T , a vertical fragmentation F of T
is a partitioning of the attributes into fragments F =
{F1, F2, ..., Fm} such that each Fi contains a disjoint subset
of the feature attributes. Therefore, it is the case that ∀Fi ∈
F , Fi ⊆ T and Fi ∩ Fj = ∅ (i 6= j) and
⋃
Fi = T
(i=1, ...,m).
In addition, it is implicitly assumed that the class at-
tribute Ac is associated with each fragment. As we will
see later, the presence of this common attribute needs to
be accounted for in a special way since it allows the re-
construction of some correspondence between the attribute
values of different fragments. Therefore, methods need to be
designed to ensure that this correspondence cannot be used
in order to attack the anonymity of the fragmented data. In
some cases, this process requires the perturbation of a few
class values, in order to ensure non-identifiability.
Note that the fragmentation process is used as a meta-
approach in conjunction with an off-the-shelf anonymiza-
tion algorithm. A fragmentation F is referred to as a k-
anonymous fragmentation after applying an anonymization
algorithm to it, if and only if the following two conditions
hold:
• Fragment k-anonymity condition: Each fragment in
F satisfies the k-anonymity condition. This condition
can be easily satisfied by applying any off-the-shelf k-
anonymity algorithm to each fragment.
• K-Anonymity non-reconstructability condition: The
relation resulting from joining any arbitrary fragments
on the class variable satisfies the k-anonymity condition.
The number of possible fragmentations of a set of features is
rather large in the high-dimensional case. For example, for
a set of n features, there may be O(nn) possible fragmen-
tations. Clearly, exhaustive search through all the possible
fragmentations for the high-dimensional case may become
prohibitive. Therefore, a systematic approach is required to
search the space of possible fragmentations. Since this work
is focussed on the classification problem, the fragmentation
approach should attempt to maximize the amount of non-
redundant information contained in each feature of a particu-
lar fragment, which is relevant for the classification process.
Correspondingly, our systematic search approach utilizes a
metric referred to as Fragmentation Minimum Redundancy
Maximum Relevance (FMRMR) in order to create fragments.
3.2 Fragmentation Minimum Redundancy Maximum
Relevance The ideal fragmentation is one in which the set
of attributes in each fragment is a comprehensive represen-
tation of the information required for the mining process.
Since this paper addresses the classification problem, the
metric will explicitly use the class variable for quantification,
though it is conceivable that the metric for other applications
would be different. In the supervised context, a comprehen-
sive representation refers to high predictability of the class
variable from the features in each fragment, while minimiz-
ing redundancy. It is evident that the simultaneous incor-
poration of features with high mutual information within a
given fragment does not provide any additional advantages,
even when they are all highly relevant to the class attribute.
This implies that a combination of the relevance to the class
attribute and the mutual information with respect to one an-
other can be useful for the process of constructing a frag-
ment.
To this effect, we draw on the feature selection literature,
which defines the concept of the Minimum Redundancy
Maximum Relevance (MRMR) metric[9, 23]. This metric
uses a dependency quantification (denoted as W ) among the
feature variables and a dependency quantification (denoted
as V ) between the feature variables and the class attribute in
each fragment. Our proposed heuristic aims at maximizing
the summation of MRMR for all the fragments in a given
fragmentation. The Fragmentation MRMR (FMRMR) is the
summation of the values of MRMR within a fragment. This
value is defined for a particular fragmentationF as follows:
FMRMR(F) =
∑|F|
t=1(Vt −Wt)
Vt =
1
|Af
t
|
∑
j∈Af
t
I(cls, j)
Wt =
1
|Af
t
|2
∑
k,j∈Af
t
I(k, j) where:
• Aft : set of features in fragment t of fragmentation F
• I(x, y): mutual information between attributes x and y
• Vt: total mutual information between the features and the
class attribute in fragment t of fragmentationF
• Wt: total pairwise mutual information between the fea-
tures in fragment t of fragmentationF
• cls: the class attribute
The overall approach for the k-anonymity uses a three-
step technique for the fragmentation process. For a high-
dimensional relation T with n features and one class at-
tribute, these three steps are as follows:
1. Use a carefully-designed search algorithm to decom-
pose the relation into fragments. The constructed frag-
ments have non-overlapping sets of features together
with the class attribute. The fragmentation process uses
the afore-mentioned measure in order to determine the
optimal fragments.
2. Anonymize each fragment separately using an existing
anonymization algorithm, such as the Mondrian multi-
dimensional k-anonymity algorithm [15].
3. At this point, it should be noted that the anonymized
fragments can be (partially) joined back using the com-
mon attribute, which in the supervised scenario is the
class attribute. Depending on the distribution of values
in the common attribute, the result might violate the k-
anonymity constraint. This is essentially a k-anonymity
non-reconstructability condition violation. Therefore,
additional steps are required in order to ensure non-
reconstructability. The techniques for achieving this are
slightly involved and distort the class variable in such
a way that non-reconstructability is guaranteed. These
methods will be described in the next section. It should
be noted that the distortion of the class variable may re-
sult in some further reduction in accuracy. However, in
practice, for most reasonable distributions, the required
distortions are very limited, if any.
The second step in the afore-mentioned list does not require
further explanation. Therefore, the exposition in this paper
will describe the detailed methods for performing the first
and the third steps. For the third step, three different
alternatives will be proposed. It should also be noted
that although the class and sensitive attributes have been
considered the same in many works, they might be different,
and data contains many sensitive attributes in practice. In
such cases, the other sensitive attributes also need to be
fragmented in order to ensure that the two fragments cannot
be joined. However, they should be fragmented only after
the quasi-identifiers have already been fragmented (using
the same approach as discussed in the next section). This
is because it is more critical to ensure that quasi-identifiers
are evenly distributed among fragments. Therefore, what
follows will only focus on quasi-identifiers for simplicity.
4 Fragmentation-based K-Anonymization
In this section, the first and third steps in the afore-mentioned
fragmentation meta-algorithm will be discussed. First, the
fragment construction heuristic will be introduced.
4.1 Fragment Construction Heuristic As the number of
features increases, the number of possible fragments grows
exponentially. This explosion in the number of fragments
makes exhaustive search in this space impractical. There-
fore, we propose an algorithm which tries to form a frag-
mentation with maximum FMRMR. For simplicity, a bi-
nary fragmentation into two parts will be described, though
it is possible in principle to fragment into multiple parts by
repeating the process.
We define the FMRMR contribution of a feature attribute
A
f
i with respect to fragment Fj of fragmentation F as the
difference between FMRMR of F after and before adding
A
f
i to Fj . The quantification of the mutual information
between the n features and the class attribute is stored
in the form of an (n + 1) × (n + 1) matrix denoted by
[MI](n+1)×(n+1).
The FMRMR metric attempts not to place features
having high mutual information in one fragment. Therefore,
as a starting point, two features having the highest mutual
information are picked as seeds and placed in different
fragments. Afterwards, in a greedy manner, and while there
exists un-assigned features, the FMRMR contributions of
all unassigned features with regards to both fragments are
calculated. The unassigned feature with the highest FMRMR
contribution is added to the relevant partition. Finally, the
common attribute (class attribute in the supervised case) is
added to each fragment separately. The overall approach
is illustrated in Algorithm 1 in the Appendix A in the
supplementary materials.
4.2 The Final Step: K-Anonymity non-Recons-
tructability As indicated earlier, applying a k-anonymity
algorithm on each fragment in order to satisfy the fragment
k-anonymity condition is not sufficient for ensuring non-
identifiability. This is because the common attribute (class
attribute) can be used for (very approximate) joins, and such
joins provide some additional information about fragment
correspondence. Therefore, in theory, it may be possible
that the overall anonymity level of the relation resulted from
joining k-anonymized fragments is less than k, though in
practice it is rather unlikely because of the approximate
nature of the join.
We call a fragmentation in which all fragments satisfy
the k-anonymity condition k-anonymity non-reconstructible
if the relations resulting from joining any arbitrary fragments
on the class attribute satisfy k-anonymity. Similarly, a frag-
mentation is called reconstructible if k-anonymity is violated
after joining some of its fragments. Definition 4.1 formally
defines a k-anonymity non-reconstructible fragmentation.
DEFINITION 4.1. (K-ANONYMITY NON-
RECONSTRUCTIBLE FRAGMENTATION). Fragmentation
F = {F1, F2, ..., Fm} which satisfies the fragment
k-anonymity condition is called k-anonymity non-
reconstructible if and only if ∀s ∈ P (F), the relation
resulting from joining members (fragments) of s satisfies the
k-anonymity condition.
The power set P (F) has 2m members. However, the
k-anonymity condition must be checked for members of size
at least 2.
It should be noted that the joining process is only
approximate and noisy, which is good for anonymization.
Therefore, successful violation attacks of the type discussed
above are often difficult to perform in practice. For example,
joining will result in some tuples that do not have any
corresponding tuple in the original table. These tuples
are called fake tuples, and may sometimes be helpful for
obfuscation of identification of relevant tuple identities.
As articulated in Definition 4.1, given a fragmentation
F with m fragments, the k-anonymity condition must be
satisfied for (2m-m-1) possible relations resulted from join-
ing arbitrary fragments. However, the relations resulted from
joining more than two fragments can be simply obtained by
consecutive binary joins. This paves the way to define the k-
anonymity non-reconstructability condition by joining only
two fragments. For instance, checking the k-anonymity non-
reconstructability condition on a relation resulting from join-
ing members of {F1, F2, ..., Fn} ∈ P (F) can be accom-
plished by checking the k-anonymity non-reconstructability
condition in each of the following binary joins: I1 = F1 ✶
F2, I2 = I1 ✶ F3, ..., In−1 = In−2 ✶ Fn.
Therefore, for simplicity, we can continue our discus-
sion with only two fragments, without any loss of generality.
This condition is formally stated in Theorem 4.1. An im-
portant concept to continue with the remaining of the paper
is to understand the notion of equivalence classes resulting
from the anonymization. In the anonymized table, records
with the same value for their quasi-identifiers constitute an
equivalence class.
THEOREM 4.1. (K-ANONYMITY NON-
RECONSTRUCTABILITY CONDITION). The condition
for a given fragmentation F = {F1, F2} which satis-
fies the fragment k-anonymity condition, and fragments
F1 = {EQ11, EQ12 , ..., EQ1n} and F2 = {EQ21, EQ22,
..., EQ2m}, to be non-reconstructible is that one of
the following must be true for each joined pair EQ1i,
EQ2j:
•
∑
c∈C1i∩C2j
freq(c, EQ1i)× freq(c, EQ2j) = 0
•
∑
c∈C1i∩C2j
freq(c, EQ1i)× freq(c, EQ2j) ≥ k
The proof of this theorem is presented in Appendix B in the
supplementary materials.
Enforcing and satisfying the k-anonymity non-
reconstructability condition in a fragmentation may require
some of the class values to be distorted. As explained
shortly, the change in the class values can be performed
using various strategies. However, minimizing the number
of changes is always desirable in order to retain accuracy.
The design of an algorithm which provably minimizes
the changes is computationally intractable because of
the exponential number of possibilities. Therefore, we
propose three heuristic strategies to enforce the k-anonymity
non-reconstructability condition. It is worth mentioning that
the utility of each strategy is different from others. Before
providing a more detailed exposition, we introduce the
concept of a dependency graph, which provides the logical
construct necessary for a good algorithmic design.
4.2.1 Dependency Graph A dependency graph is an
undirected graph structure which captures the dependency
among different equivalence classes in a given fragmenta-
tion. Nodes in the dependency graph are equivalence classes,
and there exists an edge between node EQix and EQjy pro-
vided that:
1. i 6= j that means EQix and EQjy belong to two
different fragments.
2. Cix∩Cjy 6= ∅ that meansEQix andEQjy have at least
one class value in common.
The set of all equivalence classes in a fragmentation may
be divided into subsets having no dependency on each other.
In other words, no equivalence class from one subset can be
joined with equivalence classes in the other subset. Thus,
the dependency graph is not connected, and the dependency
graph components reflect the full dependencies among all
equivalence classes, rather than a single connected depen-
dency graph. The process of constructing the dependency
graph is shown in Algorithm 2 in Appendix A in the supple-
mentary materials.
The k-anonymity non-reconstructability condition is
enforced on each connected component of the dependency
graph separately, since there is no inter-component depen-
dency. The k-anonymity non-reconstructability condition
on each connected component can also be achieved by
enforcing it on each edge. We introduce three different
strategies in order to achieve this goal.
4.2.2 Naive Enforcement Satisfying the k-anonymity
non-reconstructability condition for an edge between equiva-
lence classes EQ1i and EQ2j can simply be done by enforc-
ing each equivalence class to have only one class value. In
the naive k-anonymity non-reconstructability enforcement
approach, class values in each equivalence class are changed
to the majority class in that equivalence class. In this case,
two given equivalence classes either cannot be joined, or
their join generates at least k2 tuples. Such an approach is
clearly suboptimal, and fails to take full advantage of the
flexibility associated with distorting the class variable in a
way which is sensitive to the behavior of the remaining data.
4.2.3 Dependency Graph-based Enforcement Unlike
the naive approach, the class values in only equivalence
classes violating the k-anonymity after being joined are
changed to the majority class value in this approach. Another
difference between this approach and the naive approach is
that the dependency graph-based approach aims at minimiz-
ing the number of changes in each equivalence class. In order
to achieve this goal, this approach changes only one attribute
in each step.
Starting from a random node (current-node) in the
dependency graph, the dependency graph is explored
in a breadth-first manner. The k-anonymity non-
reconstructability condition is checked between current-
node and every single unvisited neighbor nodes. If the con-
dition does not hold between current-node and one of its un-
visited neighbors, the class values with lowest frequency in
the neighbor node is changed to the majority class value until
the condition is satisfied. After satisfying k-anonymity non-
reconstructability between current-node and all its neigh-
bor nodes, current-node is marked visited. This process
must be repeated for all components in the dependency graph
until all nodes are marked visited. The pseudocode of this
algorithm is demonstrated in Algorithm 3 in Appendix A in
the supplementary materials.
4.2.4 Enforcement via δ-selectivity In spite of the ap-
proximate nature of the join between different fragments,
they are a potential threat to k-anonymity. Thus, the preven-
tion of violating joins is important. Publishing the class val-
ues for each and every single tuple (row) in the anonymized
fragment is a major cause of this violation.
The δ-selectivity approach changes the way in which
class values are published. This enables a more relaxed
k-anonymity non-reconstructability condition enforcement
on the equivalence classes. Instead of publishing the class
values on a per tuple basis, they are published on a per
equivalence class basis with the use of ambiguous values
(slots). In an equivalence class, each class value has
equal probability of being assigned to a tuple. This results
in the possibility of assuming different instantiations (or
versions) for a given equivalence class. Then, given two
equivalence classes, there exist multiple ways to join them,
corresponding to different assignments of class values to
tuples. The modified k-anonymity non-reconstructability
condition leverages this ambiguity effectively. Appendix C.I
in the supplementary materials exemplifies tuple-level and
equivalence class-level class value publishing.
As mentioned above, the ambiguous slots in an equiv-
alence class EQij , published at the equivalence class-level,
can take any of the class values in Cij . In other words, dif-
ferent versions for EQij can be assumed.
DEFINITION 4.2. (EQUIVALENCE CLASS VERSION). An
arbitrary assignment of class values available in an equiv-
alence class EQij to ambiguous slots in EQij generates a
version of EQij shown by V (EQij).
Although publishing the class values at the equivalence
class-level reduces the risk of k-anonymity violation, the
resulting equivalence classes are still vulnerable to be joined
back and violate the k-anonymity. As an example, consider
the extreme case where the class values are unique in an
equivalence class. Each tuple in the equivalence class
is assigned to a different class value which is similar to
the case in which class values are released at the tuple
level. Given two equivalence classes whose class values
are published in equivalence class-level and have at least
one class value in common, there exist different ways to
join them. The number of tuples resulted from joining two
equivalence classes are referred to as equijoin selectivity.
Among all possible joins, those generating k tuples (or more)
are referred to as k-anonymity-preserving equijoins.
DEFINITION 4.3. (K-ANONYMITY-PRESERVING EQUI-
JOIN). Given two equivalence classes EQ1i and EQ2j
whose class values are published at the equivalence class
level, and which share at least one class value, the join be-
tween V(EQ1i) and V(EQ2j) is a k-anonymity-preserving
equijoin if and only if it produces at least k tuples.
We can now define the equijoin selectivity privacy level
in terms of the possible equijoins between two equivalence
classes.
DEFINITION 4.4. (EQUIJOIN SELECTIVITY PRIVACY
LEVEL). The ratio of number of k-anonymity-preserving
equijoins in joining two equivalence classes EQ1i and
EQ2j to the total number of possible equijoins in joining the
same equivalence classes is referred to as equijoin selectiv-
ity privacy level of EQ1i and EQ2j . This value is denoted
by η(EQ1i, EQ2j). In other words, η(EQ1i, EQ2j) =
|dsp={{V (EQ1i)}✶{V (EQ2j)}| |{V (EQ1i)}✶{V (EQ2j)}|≥k}|
|dsw={{V (EQ1i)}✶{V (EQ2j)}|
.
Intuitively, η(EQ1i, EQ2j) indicates the probability
that the result of joining EQ1i and EQ2j is a k-anonymous
equivalence class. As an example, when the value of η is 1,
it indicates that ∀v1 ∈ V (EQ1i), v2 ∈ V (EQ2j), we have
|v1 ✶ v2| ≥ k. In other words, all possible instantiations
will result in a k-anonymity-preserving equijoin.
DEFINITION 4.5. (δ-SELECTIVE K-ANONYMOUS
FRAG.). A fragmentation F = {F1, F2} that satisfies the
fragment k-anonymity condition is called δ-selective if and
only if ∀EQ1i, EQ2j we have η(EQ1i, EQ2j) ≥ δ.
Algorithm 4 in Appendix A in the supplementary mate-
rials shows how δ-selectivity can be enforced on a fragmen-
tation F .
5 Extension to ℓ-Diversity
Analogous to the k-anonymity case, a fragmentation is called
an ℓ-diverse fragmentation, if and only if 1) each fragment
satisfies the ℓ-diversity requirement (fragment ℓ-diversity
condition) and 2) joining the fragments does not violate the
ℓ-diversity requirement (ℓ-diversity non-reconstructability
condition). Satisfying the fragment ℓ-diversity condition is
similar to that of the k-anonymity case. However, for ℓ-
diversity, the non-reconstructability condition is different.
Table 2 describes the notations used in this section. A brief
overview of the steps for the fragmentation-based ℓ-diversity
is provided below:
Table 2: List of notations in fragmentation ℓ-diversity
notation explanation
F a vertical fragmentation
Fi i
th fragment in fragmentation F
Si i
th segment
CKij data chunk belongs to segment Si and fragment Fj
EQsij ith equivalence class belongs to chunk CKsj
Cij set of class values for CKij
Csij set of class values for EQ
s
ij
li diversity level of segment Si
|.| size of a set
1. Use the fragment construction algorithm proposed in
Section 4.1 solely to compute the best fragmentation
F = {F1, F2, ..., Fn}. However, the fragmentation is
not actually executed in this step.
2. Cluster data records into m segments S =
{S1, S2, ..., Sm} using a top-down clustering al-
gorithm. Stop dividing each segment Si into further
sub-segments if the resulting sub-segments either
violate the k-anonymity or ℓ-diversity requirement.
Final segment Si has the diversity level li.
3. Vertically partition each segment Si, using the frag-
ments found in Step 1, into n data chunks. The diversity
level of each data chunk CKij is equal to the diversity
level of segment Si, which is li.
4. Use any off-the-shell ℓ-diversity algorithm to
anonymize each chunk CKij . However, the di-
versity requirement of each CKij must be set to li.
5. Merge equivalence classes belonging to the same verti-
cal fragments and publish them as one fragment.
In the afore-mentioned algorithm, it is worth noting
that the clustering algorithm in the second step should be
adjusted to the relevant workload. Since the workload in our
approach is classification, a classification-oriented clustering
algorithm results in higher utility.
The ℓ-diversity non-reconstructability condition may be
violated if at least two chunks CKsi and CKsj are joined
and the resulting data set violates either the k-anonymity or
the ℓ-diversity requirement. We prove that this will not be the
case according to the way equivalence classes in chunks have
been formed. For simplicity, we prove this for the case of two
vertical fragments. However, the result is true in general.
THEOREM 5.1. The data set resulting from joining chunks
CKs1 and CKs2 neither violates k-anonymity nor ℓ-
diversity.
Again, the proof of this theorem is presented in Ap-
pendix B in the supplementary materials for the sake of
brevity. It is easy to show that this extension can be uti-
lized for t-closeness by simply enforcing t-closeness instead
of ℓ-diversity in the aforementioned steps.
5.1 Membership Disclosure Protection Fragmenting the
data can help protect against membership attack[32] by
disassociating different attributes. As discussed in [32], the
ability to determine presence or absence of a subject’s record
in the published data is a privacy threat. This can be done by
comparing the subject’s quasi-identifiers with the published
quasi-identifiers.
Consider an attacker trying to find out the member-
ship of subject v in the published fragmented data. As at-
tributes are fragmented, the attacker must find the match-
ing equivalence class in each fragment to which the sub-
ject’s attributes belong. This may not be possible consid-
ering the generalization applied on the attributes. How-
ever, provided that the attacker succeeds in finding the
matching equivalence classes EQ1i, EQ2j ,..., EQnp, the
likelihood that the record pertaining to v exists in the
published fragmented data is |EQ1i✶EQ2j✶...✶EQnp||F1✶F2✶...✶Fn| =
|EQ1i✶EQ2j✶...✶EQnp|∑
i
∑
j
...
∑
p
|EQ1i✶EQ2j✶...✶EQnp|
.
This likelihood is mostly impacted by p (the number of verti-
cal fragments), anonymity level (either k or ℓ), and |D| (size
of the data set). In most cases, the value of p is small, and
|D| ≫ k. Therefore, the numerator of the likelihood for-
mula becomes much smaller than the denominator. When
the value of p increases, the number of common class val-
ues among specific equivalence classes EQ1i, EQ2i,..., and
EQnp drops and even tends to zero in many cases. There-
fore, the chance of a successful membership attack becomes
negligible. In general, the fragmentation-based anonymiza-
tion provides strong protection against membership attack.
6 Experimental Results
In this section, we will present the experimental results
showing the effectiveness of our method. The goal is to
show that the fragmentation process is able to retain greater
utility of the data both in terms of classification measures and
information loss measures, at the same level of privacy.
We utilized two metrics to evaluate the effectiveness
of our proposed method, information loss and weighted F-
measure to capture the total amount of lost information and
evaluate the utility of the data anonymized by our meta-
algorithm, respectively. Details on how these metrics are
used on fragmented data are available in Appendix D.I in
the supplementary materials.
6.1 Baselines Since the goal was to show the effectiveness
of the fragmentation approach as a meta-algorithm, the base-
line for the approach were the results for the anonymiza-
tion process with and without fragmentation. The Mon-
drian multidimensional anonymity method [15] was used for
both the fragmented, and the unfragmented scenario. More
accurately, in Step 2 of fragmented k-anonymity, we used
median Mondrian and in Step 4 of fragmented ℓ-diversity,
we utilized ℓ-diversity Mondrian. Therefore, the qualita-
tive improvements show the effects of fragmentation, as a
methodology to improve the effectiveness of an off-the-shelf
approach.
6.2 Data Sets Real data set Musk from the UCI Machine
Learning Repository2 was used. The detailed description
of the data set is provided in the Appendix D.II of the
supplementary materials.
6.3 Results In each case, the results were measured with
varying dimensionality and anonymity level. In each case,
the anonymity level was varied after fixing the dimen-
sionality, and the dimensionality was varied on fixing the
anonymity level. The anonymity level was fixed to 40, when
the dimensionality was varied on the X-axis. While varying
the anonymity level on the X-axis, the dimensionality was
fixed to 40. In case of ℓ-diversity, the value of l is set to
2. In addition, we fixed δ to 0.5 in δ-selective enforcement
approach. It is important to note that the information loss re-
sults do not vary with the different strategies for ensuring k-
anonymity non-reconstructability, which affect only the class
variable. Since the information loss metrics are based on the
feature variables only, a single chart will be shown for the
case of information loss, whereas the performance results
for different approaches of k-anonymity (based on different
strategies for ensuring k-anonymity non-reconstructability)
and ℓ-diversity will be shown in the case of F-measure sepa-
rately by means of solid and dashed lines, respectively.
The information loss with varying dimensionality is
illustrated in Figure 1a. The dimensionality is illustrated on
the X-axis, and the information loss is illustrated on the Y -
axis in each case. Besides, diversity level is set to 2 for ℓ-
diversity in all experiments. It is evident that the information
2http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml.
Figure 1: Information loss vs. dimensionality & k
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loss of the unfragmented approach (for both k-anonymity
and ℓ-diversity) increases with increasing dimensionality,
which is in agreement of the results found earlier in [2]. In
fact, the error touches almost its upper bound, which implies
that each generalized value starts losing more and more of
its specificity in the unfragmented case. On the other hand,
the fragmentation method shows drastic improvements in the
amount of information loss, for both k-anonymity and ℓ-
diversity. This implies that a significant amount of attribute
specificity is retained in each fragment.
The information loss with increasing anonymity level is
illustrated in Figure 1b. The anonymity level is illustrated
on the X-axis, whereas the information level is illustrated
on the Y -axis. It is not surprising that the information loss
increases with the anonymity level, and enforcing diversity.
However, as in the case of the results with increasing dimen-
sionality, the improvements achieved by fragmentation were
significant.
The comparisons for the F-measure with increasing di-
mensionality are much more tricky. This is because the addi-
tion of more dimensions to a data set affects the classification
precision and recall (and hence F-measure) of the data in two
mutually contradictory ways:
• A larger number of dimensions provides greater knowl-
edge (in terms of more attributes) to the classifier in order
to improve its precision and recall.
• Data sets of larger dimensionality will have greater infor-
mation loss on a per attribute basis, and this reduces the
effectiveness of the classifiers.
So how does this tug-of-war between two mutually con-
tradictory effects impact the final classification results, and
how does the fragmentation process affect this tradeoff?
Figure 2 compares the prediction F-measure of the unfrag-
mented and fragmented anonymization methods with in-
creasing dimensionality for two classifiers. In all cases, the
different variants of the fragmentation scheme have higher
classification accuracy than the unfragmented scheme.Even
the naive scheme (in fragmented k-anonymity) was often
able to perform better than the unfragmented approach in
spite of its relative lack of sophistication in performing the
class distortions. The difference in F-measure becomes
even more drastic in case of ℓ-diversity and the fragmented
anonymization achieves up to 28% improvement over un-
fragmented scenario.
It is also immediately evident that the trend with in-
Figure 2: Prediction F-measure onMusk vs. dimensionality
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Figure 3: Prediction F-measure on MUSK vs. k
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creasing dimensionality is specific to the choice of data set,
classifier, and specific approach. In particular, an interest-
ing trend is that the F-measure changes only a little bit with
increasing dimensionality in many cases, especially for un-
fragmented data. This is because the anonymization process
in the unfragmented case changes values for many feature
attributes to the very general value as the dimensionality
grows. This change turns a high-dimensional data set into
a data set with very few useful features for the classification.
This phenomenon is reflected in the F-measure of unfrag-
mented anonymization shown in Figure 2, which often does
not vary much. In fact, only 6 feature attributes in Musk
played a significant role in the classification. As a result, the
F-measure does not vary too much with increasing dimen-
sionality. Besides, as the equivalence classes have different
class labels in the case of ℓ-diversity, the precision and recall
degrade dramatically and cause the F-measure to be very low
for unfragmented ℓ-diversity.
The effect of k on classification F-measure is illustrated
in Figure 3. The fragmented anonymization reveals a promi-
nent improvement of up to 54% compared to the unfrag-
mented anonymization. Normally, we expect the prediction
F-measure to decline with increasing values of k. While this
was often the case, there were also a few cases, where it has
an unexpected rise. This trend has also sometimes been ob-
served in earlier work, and is a result of the aggregation ef-
fects of the anonymization procedures (sometimes) remov-
ing the noisy artifacts in the data.
7 Conclusions and Summary
This paper presents a method for fragmentation-based
anonymization for high-dimensional data. While the curse
of dimensionality is a fundamental theoretical barrier, it is
often possible to obtain effective results in practice. This pa-
per uses fragmentation as a general purpose methodology to
improve the effectiveness of any off-the-shelf algorithm for
the anonymization process. Experimental results show sig-
nificant improvements of the utility of the data after the frag-
mentation process. This meta-algorithm approach is fairly
general and has the potential to be extended to a wider va-
riety of scenarios and privacy models and workloads. This
will be the focus of our future work.
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Supplementary Materials
Appendix A. Pseudocodes
Algorithm 1 depicts how a high-dimensional data set can be
broken down into fragments.
Algorithm 1 Fragment Construction Algorithm
1: // n denotes the number of features
2: MI: a (n + 1) by (n + 1) matrix storing the mutual
information (between the features and the class attribute)
3: Fragment1, Fragment2, nonAssignedFs= empty
4: Select two features having the maximum mutual infor-
mation as two seeds, seed1 and seed2.
5: Fragment1.add(seed1)
6: Fragment2.add(seed2)
7: Add the rest of features to nonAssignedFs
8: while (nonAssignedFs not empty)
9: bestF ,bestFragment=empty
10: maxContribution=0
11: foreach ai in nonAssignedFs
12: foreach f in Fragment1,Fragment2
13: if(contribution(ai,f )> maxContribution)
14: bestF=ai
15: bestFragment=f
16: maxContribution=contribution(ai,f )
17: Add bestF to f
18: Remove bestF from nonAssignedFs
19: Add the class attribute to Fragment1 and Fragment2
Algorithm 2 CreateDependencyGraph(set-of -all-EQ)
1: mark all equivalence classes in set-of -all-EQ as un-
visited
2: c-id=1
3: toBeProcessed=empty
4: root=random(set-of -all-EQ) // choose an unvisited
equivalence class randomly
5: toBeProcessed.enqueue(root)
6: while (toBeProcessed not empty)
7: current-node=toBeProcessed.dequeue()
8: visit(current-node)
9: foreach EQ in dependant(current-node)
10: if(EQ not visited)
11: draw an edge from current-node to EQ in
12: component with id=c-id
13: toBeProcessed.enqueue(EQ)
14: if (any un-visited equivalence class left)
15: c-id++
16: go to line 4
Algorithm 2 takes the set of all equivalence classes in a
given fragmentation, and constructs the dependency graph.
At the end of this process, the variable c-id indicates the
number of components with no dependency (connection).
The subroutine dependant takes an equivalence class eq in
either F1 or F2, and returns the set of equivalence classes in
the other fragment that can be joined by eq.
Algorithm 3 shows the procedure for enforcing the
condition in Theorem 4.1 in a dependency graph. This
algorithm is invoked for each component the dependency
graph in order to ensure non-identifiability. In Algorithm
3, the subroutine change (line 9) changes a class value
having the lowest frequency in its equivalence class to the
majority class value in that equivalence class. However,
this change might affect the previously satisfied k-anonymity
non-reconstructability condition between node un and its
visited neighbors. Thus, lines 10-14 re-check the previously
satisfied reconstructability condition, and if needed, the
subroutine change is called as necessary in order to re-
satisfy it.
Algorithm 3 DGBE(d-graph)
1: processing-queue = empty
2: mark all nodes in d-graph as unvisited
3: processing-queue.enqueue(random(d-graph))
4: while (processing-queue not empty)
5: current-node = processing-queue.dequeue()
6: foreach un in unvisited-neighbors(current-node)
7: while ((current-node and un) not satisfy the
8: k-anonymity non-reconstructability condition)
9: change(un)
10: if (any previously-satisfied k-anonymity
11: non-reconstructability condition violates
12: between un and visited- neighbors(un))
13: call change(un) until there is no violation
14: between un and visisted-neighbors(un)
15: visit(current-node)
16: processing-queue.enqueue(un)
Algorithm 4 shows how δ-selectivity can be enforced
on a fragmentation F . This algorithm is very similar to
Algorithm 3. It is worth noting that the class values of
equivalence classes in the dependency graph (d-graph) are
at the equivalence class-level. Subroutine change simply
removes a class value in an equivalence class. In order
to reduce the class value distortion, the class value having
the lowest frequency before converting the class values into
equivalence class-level must be removed.
Appendix B. Proofs
THEOREM 4.1. (K-ANONYMITY NON-
RECONSTRUCTABILITY CONDITION). The condition
for a given fragmentation F = {F1, F2} which satis-
fies the fragment k-anonymity condition, and fragments
Algorithm 4 δ-selectivity(d-graph, δ)
1: processing-queue = empty
2: mark all nodes in d-graph as unvisited
3: processing-queue.enqueue(random(d-graph))
4: while (processing-queue not empty)
5: current-node = processing-queue.dequeue()
6: foreach un in unvisited-neighbors(current-node)
7: while (η(un,current-node)<δ)
8: change(un)
9: if (η between un and any vn ∈ visited-
10: neighbors(un) becomes less than δ)
11: call change(un) until η(un,vn) becomes
greater
12: than δ
13: visit(current-node)
14: processing-queue.enqueue(un)
F1 = {EQ11, EQ12 , ..., EQ1n} and F2 = {EQ21, EQ22,
..., EQ2m}, to be non-reconstructible is that one of
the following must be true for each joined pair EQ1i,
EQ2j:
•
∑
c∈C1i∩C2j
freq(c, EQ1i)× freq(c, EQ2j) = 0
•
∑
c∈C1i∩C2j
freq(c, EQ1i)× freq(c, EQ2j) ≥ k
Proof. According to Definition 4.1, F is non-
reconstructible if and only if the relation F1 ✶ F2
satisfies k-anonymity.
Joining two equivalence classes EQ1i and EQ2j gen-
erates tuples with the same value for their quasi-identifiers.
If the number of generated tuples is greater than k, joining
EQ1i and EQ2j does not violate the k-anonymity property.
For any given equivalence classes EQ1i and EQ2j , one of
the following conditions is true:
• CLS = C1i ∩ C2j = ∅.
• CLS = C1i ∩ C2j = {c1 , c2, ..., cw}.
If the former condition is true, EQ1i and EQ2j do not
have any common values to be joined on. Therefore, we
have:
∑
c∈∅
freq(c, EQ1i)× freq(c, EQ2j) = 0
If the latter condition is true, the joining of EQ1i and EQ2j
will result in
∑
c∈CLS freq(c, EQ1i) × freq(c, EQ2j) tu-
ples. Thus, the result of joining EQ1i and EQ2j is k-
anonymous if the number of resulting tuples is at least k.
Therefore, in either case the resulting fragmentation F is k-
anonymity non-reconstructible.
THEOREM 5.1. The data set resulting from joining
chunks CKs1 and CKs2 neither violates k-anonymity nor
ℓ-diversity.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we discriminate between dif-
ferent types of ℓ-diversity, and investigate each model indi-
vidually.
Distinct ℓ-diversity: The joining of CKs1 and CKs2
is performed based on joining equivalence classes EQsi1 and
EQsj2. According to the Step 4 of fragmentation-based ℓ-
diversity, EQsi1 and EQsj2 have been constructed in such a
way that have the same set (of size ls) of class values with
frequencies {fx1 , fx2 , ..., fxls} and {f
y
1 , f
y
2 , ..., f
y
ls
}, respec-
tively. Since both EQsi1 and EQsj2 satisfy the k-anonymity,
we have:
1)|EQsi1| = f
1
1 + f
1
2 + ...+ f
1
ls
≥ k
2)|EQsj2| = f
2
1 + f
2
2 + ...+ f
2
ls
≥ k
Evidently, joining EQsi1 and EQsj2 are based on the
common sensitive values, thus it results in a data set of size
f11 × f
2
1 + f
1
2 × f
2
2 + ... + f
1
ls
× f2ls having exactly ls
sensitive values. Therefore, the data set resulting from this
join satisfies the distinct ℓ-diversity. Since joining each pair
of arbitrary equivalence classes EQsi1 and EQsj2 satisfies the
distinct ℓ-diversity, joining CKs1 and CKs2 also satisfies
this privacy requirement.
Entropy (or recursive) ℓ-diversity: This part is a bit
trickier. Joining each pair of equivalence classes EQsi1 and
EQsj2 will result in a data set with at least k tuples (with
the same reasoning as distinct ℓ-diversity), but most likely
different level of diversity than ls (it can be lower or higher
than ls). This might be considered as a privacy violation.
However, joining all possible pairs of equivalence classes
EQsi1 and EQsj2 generates a data set consisting of both real
(all tuples in Ss) and fake tuples. There is an important
observation here. If the attacker has enough background
knowledge to rule out the faked tuples, the diversity level
of real tuples are exactly equal to ls. Hence, this is not a
privacy violation.
Appendix C. Enforcement via δ-selectivity
I. Tuple-level vs. equivalence class-level class value
publishing
Table 3 exemplifies the difference between tuple-level and
equivalence class-level publishing for a 5-anonymized frag-
ment. As Table 3b illustrates, publishing the class values in
the equivalence class-level usually results in an equivalence
class with some ambiguous slots for its class values. For ex-
ample, two ambiguous slots are illustrated in Table 3b. The
only case in which publishing at the equivalence class-level
does not result in an ambiguous slot is when the class values
are unique in the equivalence class. As no further informa-
tion is published regarding the frequency of the class values
in each equivalence class, any class value available in the
equivalence class can be placed in the ambiguous slots.
Table 3: Tuple-level vs. equivalence class-level class value
publishing
(a) Tuple-level class
value publishing for
k = 5.
23 M flu
23 M pneumonia
23 M dyspepsia
23 M pneumonia
23 M flu
(b) Equivalence class-
level class value pub-
lishing for k = 5.
23 M
23 M flu
23 M pneumonia
23 M dyspepsia
23 M
The ambiguous slots in an equivalence class EQij ,
published at the equivalence class-level, can take any of
the class values in Cij . In other words, different versions
for EQij can be assumed. Table 4 illustrates two possible
versions for the equivalence class in Table 3b.
Table 4: Two possible versions of Table 3b
(a) Version 1
23 M flu
23 M flu
23 M dyspepsia
23 M pneumonia
23 M flu
(b) Version 2
23 M pneumonia
23 M flu
23 M dyspepsia
23 M pneumonia
23 M dyspepsia
II. A subtle way to find η
Given two equivalence classes EQ1i and EQ2j whose class
values are published in equivalence class-level and have at
least one class value in common, we find the number of
tuples resulted from their join which is referred to as equijoin
selectivity in the literature. As |EQ1i| and |C1i| refer to the
number of tuples and the class values (in equivalence class-
level) in EQ1i, the number of ambiguous slots is equal to
|EQ1i| − |C1i|. The set {V (EQ1i)} represents different
versions (or instantiations) of EQ1i. Each member of this
set is a combination of |EQ1i| tuples in which there exist at
least one tuple per each class value in C1i. The size of this
set is equal to
((|EQ1i|−|C1i|)+|C1i|−1
(|EQ1i|−|C1i|)
)
.
There exist |{V (EQ1i)}|×|{V (EQ2j)}| different ways
to join EQ1i and EQ2j . Among all possible joins, those
generating k tuples (or more) are referred to as k-anonymity-
preserving equijoins.
In η formula, calculating the denominator is straightfor-
ward by multiplying |V (EQ1i)| and |V (EQ2j)|. However,
computing the numerator is more challenging. The simplest
way is perform all joins, and count those which satisfy the
minimum cardinality of k. A more subtle way is to consider
the conditions (constraints) that exist on the number of class
values in each equivalence class and map the problem as fol-
lows:
The number of pairs (A,B) of integer vectors
A =(a1, a2, ..., ac) and B =(b1, b2, ..., bc) in which ad
and bd depict the frequency of dth common class value in
V (EQ1i) and V (EQ2j) respectively, such that the follow-
ing conditions are satisfied:
condition 1:
∑
ad × bd ≥ k
condition 2: 1 ≤ ad ≤ (1 + |EQ1i| − |C1i|)
condition 3: 1 ≤ bd ≤ (1 + |EQ2j | − |C2j |)
condition 4:
∑
ad ≤ |CLS|+ |EQ1i| − |C1i|
condition 5:
∑
bd ≤ |CLS|+ |EQ2j | − |C2j |
where CLS = C1i ∩ C2j .
Appendix D. Experiments
I. Performance measures
We utilized two metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of our
proposed method. The first one is the widely-used metric
known as information loss, which captures the total amount
of lost information due to generalization. In fact, this metric
shows the usefulness of data on a per-attribute basis for
general workloads. For an anonymized data set with n tuples
and m attributes, the information loss I is computed as
follows:
I =
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1
|upperij−lowerij |
n·m·|maxj−minj |
Here, lowerij and upperij represent the lower and
upper bounds of attribute j in tuple i after generalization,
and minj and maxj represent the maximum and minimum
values taken by attribute j over all records. Note that the
computation in the fragmented and unfragmented case is not
different, as long as all the different attributes in the different
fragments are used. This is the most direct measure of the
data quality, since it normalizes the final result by the number
of attributes.
To evaluate the utility of the data anonymized by our
meta-algorithm, we calculated the weighted F-measure of
a classifier trained on the anonymous fragmentation. This
metric reflects the goodness of classifier more accurately
in case on unevenly distributed test data. Each fragment
was used to train the classifier separately. For a given test
instance, the different fragments of the training data were
trained separately, and the weighted majority label from the
different classifiers was reported, where the weight used was
score returned by the classifier from each fragment. Each
class label was once considered as positive (and once as
negative) and the weighted F-measure for each case was
calculated by taking into account the fraction of the positive
instances. We used J483 and a k-NN4 classifier in Weka with
3J48 is an open source implementation of C4.5 in Java,
http://weka.sourceforge.net/doc/weka/classifiers/trees/J48.html.
4http://weka.sourceforge.net/doc/weka/classifiers/lazy/IBk.html.
Table 5: Class distributions in Musk data set
class train test
musk 1017 207
non-musk 3983 1867
the default setting. The value of k in k-NN was set to 5.
The learning from generalized values was also done by the
technique used in [16]. In each case, the decomposition was
performed into two fragments.
In addition, the amount of distortion required to the
class values (for fragmentation k-anonymity) was measured.
Specifically, the number of distorted class values were com-
puted for each of the different techniques. The aim is to show
that the amount of distortion required was relatively small.
II. Data set description
Real data set Musk from the UCI Machine Learning Repos-
itory5 was used. It contains 7074 instances with 168 nu-
merical feature attributes describing a set of molecules. The
goal is to predict whether a molecule is musk or non-musk.
In order to test the effects of varying data dimensionality,
we chose 10, 20, 30, and 40 features randomly and con-
structed four versions of Musk with different dimension-
ality. Around 70% of the Musk data set was used for
training. The distribution of the two classes in the train-
ing and test data set is shown in Table 5. Although the
data set used in this work is numerical, the proposed meta-
algorithm can be used to anonymize categorical values by
simply using an off-the-shell anonymization technique capa-
ble to anonymize categorical values in Step 2 and 4 of frag-
mentation k-anonymity and ℓ-diversity, respectively.
5http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml.
